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1 Introduction
It is now 50 years since the Milton Friedman article “The Social Responsibility of
Business Is to Increase Its Profits” (New York Times, 13 September 1970) was
published. This analysis sets out some of the main principles of a rebuttal of the
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original Friedman article, compelling fresh empirical evidence of why Lynn Stout
was correct in her resolute critique of the thesis of shareholder primacy at the heart
of the Friedman doctrine, and how shareholder primacy continues to be pro-
foundly damaging to the corporations that uphold this belief.1
It can be contended that the Friedman’s doctrine of “The Social
Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits” has had a catastrophic
impact upon US business beginning with General Motors failure to respond to
investor calls for increased concern for safety and pollution at the time of
Friedman’s intervention in 1970, stretching through the junk bond revolution
(Bailey, 1991; Henwood, 1998; Lazonick & O’Sullivan, 2000), many corporate
collapses, and the global financial crisis (Standing, 2016; Wolfson & Epstein,
2013); all the way to the recent fatal errors of Boeing in placing a higher priority in
getting the new Boeing 737 MAX into the market, rather than ensuring the
soundness of software controls on the flight deck, which led to two horrific plane
crashes in 2018 and 2019 with the loss of 346 lives, and widespread condemna-
tion of the irresponsibility of the corporation (Hawkens, 2019; Slotnick, 2019;
Transportation and Infrastructure, 2020).
These tragic errors in corporate judgement are ultimately based upon the
constricted sense of corporate purpose imposed by Milton Friedman and taken up
with enthusiasm by agency theorists focused uponmaximising shareholder value.
1 At the CONVIVIUM annual conference with the Society for the Advancement of Socio- Eco-
nomics (SASE) Annual Meeting at MIT in Boston in June 2012, there was a keen debate on the
purpose of the corporationmoderated by Yuri Biondi (SASE, 2012). Bill Lazonick and Jean-Philippe
Robe made sterling presentations on how misleading and damaging the doctrine of maximising
shareholder value had proved for corporations. Lynn Stout commented it was the right time to
coordinate a robust intellectual response to the pervasive and continuing impact of Milton
Friedman’s doctrine on shareholder primacy that was a central part of the underpinning ideology
of agency theory. She argued that a definitive rebuttal of Friedman’s original article in the Review
section of theNewYork Times published as “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits” in 1970 was long overdue (Friedman, 1970). The session participants commenced the
initial outline of an article intended for the New York Times, but sadly this important article was
never completed or submitted, partly due to Lynn Stout’s passing in 2018. (TheNewYork Times did
mark the 50th anniversary of Friedman’s intervention in “A Free Market Manifesto That Changed
the World, Reconsidered,” 11 September 2020). Fortunately, Lynn Stout already had set out her
views on shareholder primacy in detail in an influential monograph The Shareholder Value Myth:
How Putting Shareholders First Harms Investors, Corporations, and the Public (2012a; 2012b; 2012c),
which was supported by a concerted critique of Milton Friedman’s shareholder primacy by Jean-
Philippe Robe (2012). Subsequently a special issue ofAccounting, Economics and Law: A Convivium
(Volume 3, Issue 1, 2013) reviewing Lynn Stout’s book Shareholder Value Myth (2012a) did record
the highlights of the debate in Boston in articles by Stevelman (2013), Clarke (2013), Weinstein
(2013) and Stout (2013a), in which Lynn Stout addressed “the troubling question of corporate
purpose.”
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This reckless single-mindedness has privileged the pursuit of the narrowest of
financial measures of performance above fundamentals including passenger
safety and environmental emissions controls. As a result, innocent lives have been
lost, corporate brands have been tarnished, and ultimately the strategic future of
significant corporations endangered. Historically corporations were guided by a
wider range of performance measures that offered a robust and viable alternative
to profit maximising (Anthony, 2007; Simon, 2007). Routinely managers do of
necessity employ multiple financial and non-financial measures of performance
(Robinson, 1998), though these are rarely referred to byCEOs at AGMs transfixedby
shareholder value returns. More recently the criticality of sustainability perfor-
mance measures has come into prominence (Eccles, Ioannia, & Serafeim, 2014), a
development with which many other companies have failed to keep pace in any
practical way.
This article will examine the conceptual failings of Friedman’s call for
shareholder primacy and the devastating consequences for corporations that
have pursued this doctrine in practice without regard for other stakeholders.
The increasing financialisation of the US economy is examined where finance
ultimately determines corporate structure and purpose and claims possession
of all the profits of corporate enterprise in dividends and share-buybacks.
Assessing the strategic impact of the shareholder primacy doctrine upon
American corporations, the long slow decline of General Motors is examined
(the corporation that Friedman directed his original advice to). Bringing the
analysis up to date the sudden catastrophic failure of the Boeing 737 MAX is
attributed to the Boeing management concentrating on market share in the
aerospace business and returns to shareholders, and fatally neglecting en-
gineering standards and passenger health and safety.
The analysis continues with an examination of the reasons why Stout’s
resounding critique of shareholder primacy are robust and reflect now the
redirection of business internationally towards more purpose-driven principles
that encompass the interests of all stakeholders. This focuses upon the aston-
ishing announcement of the US Business Roundtable in 2019 abandoning its
decades long principle of shareholder primacy and replacing this with an
enlightened interpretation of stakeholder capitalism. Whether this does
represent a new concrete commitment, or simply an elegant effort at purpose
washing – changing the rhetoric of their principles but not the substance is
considered. Other initiatives to redirect the purpose of business are reviewed
including the ambitious program of the British Academy. The developing mo-
mentum for responsible business in multiple initiatives across the world,
coalescing around the UN Principles of Responsible Investment is highlighted.
Finally, the critical question of how fine policy rhetoric may be directed towards
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the implementation of new director duties, corporate strategies, measures of
performance, and disclosure is emphasized.
2 Why Milton Friedman was Wrong
Milton Friedman’s work Capitalism and Freedom (1962) along with Friedrich
Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) helped define a narrow view of freedom and
democracy as dependent on individuals, corporations and markets and won
Friedman the 1976 Nobel Prize for Economics. Collective or social conceptions
of work, enterprise or economies somehow were regarded as incipiently total-
itarian. Friedman even allocated the growing interest in corporate social re-
sponsibility to this category of creeping collectivisation concluding:
“The doctrine of “social responsibility” taken seriously would extend the scope of the po-
litical mechanism to every human activity. It does not differ in philosophy from the most
explicitly collective doctrine. It differs only by professing to believe that collectivist ends can
be attained without collectivist means. That is why, in my book Capitalism and Freedom, I
have called it a ‘fundamentally subversive doctrine’ in a free society, and have said that in
such a society, ‘there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the
rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition without deception or
fraud” (New York Times 13 September 1970).
This perverse doctrine of Friedman provided, or at least foreshadowed, the
philosophical underpinning for the hegemony of agency theory and the
consequent corporate impulsion towards the maximisation of shareholder
value over the last half century. Agency theory is often regarded not only as the
dominant current interpretation of the core dilemma of doing business, but as
an eternal and universal explanation of corporate governance. In fact, agency
theory is of recent origin, and is very much a product of the Anglo-American
world. Rooted in neoclassical finance and economics, it has somehowmanaged
to penetrate not only policy and practice but the essential understanding of
corporate law regarding directors’ duties (Clarke, 2013; 2016). According to
agency theory, the central role of the board of directors is to monitor managers
(the agents) to ensure their interests do not diverge substantially from those of
the principals (the shareholders), and to devote the company to maximising
principals’ return (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For Jensen “the stock market is
always axiomatically the ultimate arbiter of social good” (Henwood, 1998: 260;
Krippner, 2012).
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Agency theory has become “a cornerstone of… corporate governance” (Lan &
Heracleous, 2010: 294) despite the profound flaws of agency theory becoming
increasingly apparent (Clarke, 2013: 22):
– Agency theory focuses on an oversimplification of complex financial and
business reality.
– Agency theory damagingly insists upon the single corporate objective of
maximising shareholder value.
– Agency theory misconceives the motivations of managers.
– Agency theory ignores the diversity of investment institutions and interests.
– Agency theory debilitates managers and corporations, and ultimately
weakens economies.
– Agency theory achieves the opposite of its intended effect.
2.1 The Financialisation of the US Corporation
Agency theory has driven the increasing financialisation of US corporations
encompassing the increasing dominance of financial motives, financial markets,
and financial institutions to focus continuously towards maximising shareholder
value (Biondi & Graeff, 2020; Clarke, 2014a; Krippner, 2012; Useem, 1996; Van der
Zwan, 2014), and the distribution of ever-larger dividends and share buy-backs to
increase shareholder returns, and inflate executive reward through stock options
(Lazonick, 2014; 2015; 2016). Agency theory asserts shareholder value as the ulti-
mate corporate objective whichmanagers are incentivised and impelled to pursue:
“The crisis has shown that managers are often incapable of resisting pressure from share-
holders. In their management decisions, the short-term market value counts more than the
long-term health of the firm” (Segrestin & Hatchuel, 2011, 484; Jordi, 2010)
Bill Lazonick and others have railed against the adoption of the maximisation of
shareholder value replacing the retain and reinvest philosophy that typified US
industry through the middle decades of the 20th century as the driving force of
Anglo-American enterprise:
“The ideology of maximizing shareholder value is an ideology through which corporate
executives have been able to enrich themselves… The economists’ and corporate executives’
mantra from 1980 until the 2007–2008 meltdown of shareholder value and the need to
‘disgorge … free cash flow’ translated into executive option grants and stocbuybacks, and
resulted in increasing dramatically those executive options’ value” (Lazonick, 2012: 476;
2017).
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Supporting the increasing trends towards awarding executive options, Jensen and
Murphy (1990) insisted top managers should not be paid by fixed salaries as bu-
reaucrats and should be instead incentivised towards higher performance through
share-based payments including stock options. However far from incentivising ex-
ecutives towards better performance in shareholder interests, the availability of
ever-increasing stock-options focused executives more exclusively than ever upon
their own interests in inflating share prices, then getting their own reward through
the roof. Later Murphy (1998) admitted: “It is difficult to document that the increase
in stock-based incentives has led CEOs to work harder, smarter, and more in the
interest of shareholders.” Finally,Murphy conceded in 2005 that “Wewanted to give
them a bottle of wine to thank them for their efforts. We never imagined they would
take the whole vineyard …” (Melbourne University, 2005). The explosion of stock
options increased from zero in the 1980s to 60 per cent of median pay for CEOs of
Fortune 500 companies by 2001 (Figure 1) (Clarke, 2013; Stout, 2012a).
Figure 1 shows evidence of this pattern in median CEO pay since the1980s,
where equity options that initially were introduced simply as an additional
incentive, quickly exceeded executives salary and bonus rewards, and encouraged
executives to focus on shareholder returns as a means of enriching themselves in
the short term (and reductions in CEOs average tenuremeant the short termwas all
they considered). In the longer-term shareholders discovered US companies in
many sectors became weaker and less able to deliver returns, as equity-based
incentives achieved the opposite of their intended effect. In reality this incentive
Figure 1: Composition of Median CEO Pay in the US (1989–2012).
Source: Compiled from ForbesAnnual ExecutiveCompensation Report. http://www.forbes.com/
lists/2012/12/ceo-compensation-12-historical-pay-chart.htmlHall, Brian J. (2003), Six
Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 15(3): 21–23.
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mechanismhas displaced corporate goals from investing in the long-term future of
their corporation’s success, to disbursing as much money as possible in the im-
mediate term to shareholders (and executives). Any balanced conception that the
purpose of the corporation was not only to produce returns to investors, but to
provide useful employment, to produce quality products for customers, and to be
responsible corporate citizens, was lost (Biondi, 2012; Biondi, Canziani, & Kirat,
2007; Clarke, 2014b; Robe, 2012; Stout, 2012b; Weinstein, 2012, 2013).
The consequences for the US economy and society of this developing commit-
ment by markets, corporations and executives towards narrow self-interest was
increasing unemployment, poverty and inequality that began to disfigure once
prosperous industrial communities in the United States, and in other economies
where corporations adopted these values (Clarke, Jaris, & Gholamshahi, 2019a;
Markoits, 2020). Due to lack of investment structurally large swathes of US
manufacturing industry fell into disrepair and decline: “Shareholder primacy
thinking is discouraging U.S. corporations from pursuing long-term projects. For
example, in themiddle of the twentieth century itwas common for public companies
to retain about 50%of their profits for reinvestment. Over the past 30years, however,
companies have started to retainmuch less, and to pay outmuchmore in the form of
dividends and share repurchases.Indeed, in the last few years, aggregate corporate
payouts to shareholders have actually matched or exceeded aggregate corporate
profits” (Mason, 2015).
2.2 The Increasing Distribution to Shareholders: Dividends
and Share-Buybacks
In particular, share buybacks surpassed dividend payments in 1997 for the first
time, and since then in recent stock market booms buybacks consistently have
exceeded dividend payments. Lazonick, Erdem and Hopkins have catalogued the
increasing momentum of share buybacks: “The 465 companies in the S&P 500
Index in January 2019 that were publicly listed between 2009 and 2018 spent, over
that decade, $4.3 trillion on buybacks, equal to 52% of net income, and another
$3.3 trillion on dividends, an additional 39% of net income” (Lazonick, Sakinc, &
Hopkins, 2020). Figure 2 illustrates the phenomenal growth of share buybacks in
theUS displacing the investment in plant, equipment and skills necessary to create
innovative products and processes. “In fact, in 2018, only 43% of companies in the
S&P 500 Index recorded any R&D expenses, with just 38 companies accounting for
75% of the R&D spending of all 500 companies” (Lazonick et al., 2020).
It should be noted that such buyback policies were formerly illegal, and the
idea was frowned upon by regulators as offering opportunities for corporations to
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manipulate their stock price. This prevailed through the 20th century until in 1982
the Securities and Exchange Commission during the Reagan presidency created a
legal process for share buybacks which opened the floodgates for companies to
make mass purchases of their own shares (Thomas, 2019). After this reform, ex-
ecutiveswere utilising the funds previously allocated to other productive purposes
of corporations such as investing in innovative technology and new product
development to instead reward shareholders (beyond their existing dividends) and
executives (beyond their existing bonuses) (Sakinc, 2017: 24). Furthermore there is
evidence that company executives are utilising share buybacks as a lucrative
means of taking advantage of the jump in share price following the share buyback
announcement to personally cash out of the shares: “It’s one thing for a corporate
board and top executives to decide that a buyback is the right thing to do with the
company’s capital. It’s another for them to use that decision as an opportunity to
pocket some cash at the expense of the shareholders they have a duty to protect,
the workers they employ, or the communities they serve.” (Jackson, 2018). Share
buybacks became associated with Anglo-American corporations, while European
corporations focused upon delivering excessively over-generous dividends to
shareholders to maintain their share price (Sakinc, 2017: 13).
Important research by Sakinc (2017) demonstrates that when total dividends
and total share repurchases of major corporations in Europe are combined it
becomes clear that they, like their Anglo-American counterparts, devoted a
substantial part of their net income to the benefit of their shareholders (Table 1).
Taking a large sample of S&P listed companies and S&P 500 Europe 350
Figure 2: Data on 373 Companies in the S & P 500 Index Share Buy Backs in USD Billion.
Source: Adapted from: Lazonick et al. (2020); S & P Compustat database and company 10-K
filings constructed by Mustafa Erdem Sakinc and Emre Gomec of the Academic Industry
Research Network.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































companies, the average share repurchases plus dividends combined in each region
have tracked each other closely in the years 2000–2015, only diverging in the later
years (Figure 3). When the total payout (share repurchases plus dividends) as a
Figure 3: Average Share Repurchases + Dividends of 419 US S&P500 and 298 S&P. Europe 350
Companies 2000–2015 in $Million.
Source: Adapted from: Sakinc (2017).
Figure 4: Total Payout (Share Repurchases +Dividends) as a Proportion of Net Income of 419 US
S&P500 and 298 S&P Europe 350, 2000–2015.
Source: Adapted from: Sakinc (2017).
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proportion of net income of 419 US S&P 500 and 298 S&P Europe 350, for the years
2000–2015 is considered, Sakinc (2017) examines how both US and European
companies are prepared to devote all of their net income to dividends and share-
buybacks, and even are prepared to borrow in order to do so (Figure 4). Borrowing
to pay dividends and buyback shares might be considered highly irrational
behaviour, however in a heavily financialised economy where value extraction
rather than investment for value creation has become the norm for companies and
financial investors, this short-term thinking is considered rational andnecessary to
appease the immediate needs of the financial markets, but in the long run can lead
to the wholesale wrecking of what were once great companies.
Lazonick (2017) highlights the perverse results of the increasing distribution
towards shareholders, particularly in the form of stock repurchases: that corpo-
rations have become suppliers of capital to the stockmarket in the US over the last
three decades, rather than the stock market supplying capital to the corporations.
Figure 5 provides evidence for both financial and non-financial companies. Laz-
onick (2017:2) examines net equity issues, that is newly issued corporate shares
minus outstanding shares retired through stock repurchases and merger and
acquisition activity in theUnited States between 1946 and 2016 (Figure 5). From the
mid-1980s net equity issues for non-financial corporations have proved generally
negative, but since the mid-2000s have been massively negative Lazonick calcu-
lates, amounting tominus US$ 4,466 billion. That is, the investors in the U.S. stock
Figure 5: Net Equity Issues, Nonfinancial and Financial Companies 1946–2016.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release
Z.l, “Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of Funds, Balance Sheets, and Integrated
Macroeconomic Accounts,” Table F-223: Corporate Equities, March 9, 2017, at https:ffwww.
federalresere.gofreleasesfzlfeurrentf.
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exchanges in recent decades have been increasingly draining equity capital out of
corporations, rather than investing equity capital in corporations. This enrichment
of the investment institutions has benefited investors, (though 92% of business
equity is held by just 10 per cent of the U.S. population) (Clarke, Jarvis, & Gho-
lamshahi, 2019), and the majority of this equity is owned by the richest 1% ac-
cording to Wolff (2012). Hedge funds and other active funds have delighted in
aggressively stripping out the resources of innovative corporations such as Apple,
that have become giant cash machines for enriching investors dispensing hun-
dreds of billions of dollars in recent years (Clarke & Boersma, 2017). This draining
of the capital of non- financial companies by activist investors has serious con-
sequences for the capacity of corporations to invest in innovation for their future,
to provide employment and advance new skills, and to innovate their products and
develop new markets.
The structural damage to the US economy and society caused by the narrow-
minded self- interest of maximising shareholder value is immense, but the fatal
consequences for individual corporations of such an irresponsible doctrine is also
yet to be fully revealed.
Beginning with the failure of General Motors all the way through to the Boeing
catastrophe, the extent of the havoc wreaked by the philosophy of Friedman is
hard to imagine.What follows are brief case examinations of how the commitment
to shareholder value imperatives almost destroyed both General Motors and
Boeing, two of the greatest manufacturing companies in the history of America.
The resolute deconstruction of themyth of shareholder value by Lynn Stout is then
outlined, followed by a consideration of whether an evolving sense of account-
ability in the context of imminent climate change is actually causing corporations
to develop a new sense of purpose in a world facing environmental perils never
before imagined.
2.3 General Motors
The startling intervention ofMilton Friedmanmade inTheNewYork Times, came in
response to the events that took place at the General Motors May 1970 AGM, and
provoked universal attention to his short-sighted doctrine and made him a media
star, and guest at establishment dinners (McGurn, 2020). A shareholder rebellion
at the meeting attempted by members of Campaign G.M. demanded G.M. to name
three new directors to represent the public interest and set up a committee to study
the company’s performance in areas of public concern focusing on safety of ve-
hicles and pollution controls. The Campaign G.M. representatives who spoke at the
AGM included Jerome Kretchmer, a New York Environmental Protection
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Administrator; Betty Furness, a consumer affairs adviser to the Johnson Admin-
istration; John Esposito a lawyer; BarbaraWilliams a black law student fromUCLA;
Robert Townsend author of Up the Organisation (Townsend, 1970) and former US
Navy officer and CEO of Avis; and the Reverend Channing Phillips, a civil rights
activist. The AGM vote went overwhelmingly against the Campaign G.M. resolu-
tion, but management in response to the second demand, later named five di-
rectors to a public policy committee. Friedman dismissed such calls for social
responsibility in business as “pure and unadulterated socialism,” commenting
“businessmen who talk this way are unwitting puppets of the intellectual forces
that have been undermining the basis of a free society” (New York Times 13
September 1970).
American technology, and specifically the expertise of GM in electric engines
and pollution Controls, was well placed at this time to lead the world and claim
pole position in new automotive technologies which would have offered a global
competitive advantage for decades to come (Edwards, 2006). But what happened
to GM during the critical period 1970–2020 was precisely the reverse, and central
among the reasons for this signal failure in GM management imagination was the
pervasive and insidious influence of the ideology of short-sighted and self-
interested shareholder value maximisation propagated by Milton Friedman.
At a time when American technology was well positioned to claim interna-
tional leadership on car emissions reductions, the approach advocated by Milton
Friedman was destructive self-interest: “What does it mean to say that the
corporate executive has a ‘social responsibility’ in his capacity as businessman? If
this statement is not pure rhetoric, it mustmean that he is to act in someway that is
not in the interest of his employers. For example… that he is tomake expenditures
on reducing pollution beyond the amount that is in the best interests of the cor-
poration or that is required by law in order to contribute to the social objective of
improving the environment” (New York Times 13 September 1970). In fact, it
transpired that it was not just the environment, but the strategic future of General
Motors that Friedmanwas trashing with this deeply flawed logic that separates the
interests of the corporation from the interests of the public and the environment.
General Motors developed the Impact electric concept car – labelled EV1 – in
1990 in the context of the California Air Resources Board (CARB) making the
production and sale of zero-emissions vehicles a requirement of auto-
manufacturers who sold cars in California. At the time California had the worst
air quality of all the states in North America. Subsequently GM launched the EV1 as
the first mass-produced, purpose-designed electric vehicle from a major manu-
facturer. Thiswas supplied under lease-only agreements from 1996 to 1999 to allow
an engineering evaluation of the new concept as a commuter vehicle. But mean-
while an alliance of US automotive manufacturers litigated against the CARB
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regulations and this resulted in a revision of the California regulation to simply
support the production of low emission and hybrid cars. Though customers were
very positive about the new electric vehicles they leased and many wished to
continue their leases, GM preferred to concentrate on the high profit margin
existing mass market of internal combustion petrol engine vehicles.
As a result GM insisted on repossessing the leased vehicles (to the distress of
many of their customers who liked the cars and wished to carry on with their
leases), and proceeded to crush the cars secretly in the desert (Edwards, 2006;
Paine, 2006).
In what can only be described as an historic strategic mistake, essentially GM
self-sabotaged its pioneering electric car program in favour of releasing immediate
returns to shareholders. Though the company continuedwith prototype variants in
its electronic divisions including Hughes Electronics and Delco, through neglect it
progressively lost the technological lead it once possessed to Japanese and Eu-
ropean automakerswhoweremore committed to investing in the new technologies
and achieving their vast potential. However, two American innovators who were
shocked by the GM recall of all its EV1 electric cars, Martin Eberhard and Marc
Tarpenning, founded Tesla Motors in 2003, which Elon Musk joined in 2004. The
goal of the new company was to commercialise electric vehicles for the mass
market (Davies, 2016; US Department of Energy, 2015). This Tesla did with spec-
tacular success, leaving GM in its slipstream.
By 2018 Tesla had become the world’s best-selling plug-in passenger car
manufacturer, with the prospects not only to become one of theworld’s leading car
manufacturers, but also a world leader in solar and battery technology. Early in
2019 Tesla’smarket capitalisationwas $53.5 billion,while GM, once the leading car
manufacturer in America and the world, was left languishing with a market cap-
italisation of $50.5 billion. Yet Tesla at the time had only 1% of the sales of GM. The
following year Tesla’s share price rocketed, and market capitalisation tripled from
$81 billion at the end of 2019 to a peak of $287 billion in August 2020 (worth several
times the collective market capitalisation of all of the established US car com-
panies). The equity investment markets clearly placed enormous value in Tesla’s
pioneering technologies and vast earnings prospects, while GM was virtually
consigned to the category of industrial dinosaur (for essentially doing what it
thought the investment markets demanded in delivering sales revenues from
established models, while neglecting investment in advanced electrical technol-
ogies with low emissions).
It would be fanciful to attribute this collapse in the fortunes of GM simply to
Milton Friedman and the doctrine of shareholder value, but this malign influence
did help cripple the company by preventing it from playing to its strengths and
undermining its innovative and strategic dynamism. In the face of tough
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competition from smaller more innovative and fuel efficient vehicles from Europe
and Japan, the US market share of the Big Three US auto makers (GM, Ford, and
Chrysler) declined from 705 in 1998 to 53% in 2008 (CNN Money, 2010). In 2009-
10 GMendured Chapter 11 bankruptcywith the backing of the government (Pascus,
2018). It took the near-collapse of GM during the global financial crisis (due to the
crippling extent of its financial interests in its car loan subsidiary) and the inter-
vention of the Obama government, which insisted on any public funding for re-
covery of GM to be tied to green technology, to re-energise the development of
electric engines at GM, which led to the launch of the GM Bolt, their first electric car
for the masses (Davies, 2016). Now that Tesla has tested the global market for
electric vehicles and benefited with a vast share market value, it will face tough
competition from all the major car corporations, including the Nissan Leaf and
GM’s Bolt (Washington Post 14 June 2019; Hage & Hesse, 2020). Though GM began
to plan for an all-electric fleet of vehicles and brighter future, it was once again
subject to appeals from shareholders who argued against its progressive plans
towards zero carbon emissions (SEC, 2018). In the middle of its supposed green
transformation, GM took sides with President Trump in his clash with California
over pollution standards which made its claim to pursuing a zero emissions policy
somewhat tenuous (New York Times, 2019). (GM quickly abandoned this opposi-
tion to California's pollution controls with the election of President Biden.
These recurrent and critical short-term weaknesses imposed on companies by
the doctrine of shareholder value are apparent in many systemic and corporate
collapses in recent decades. The global financial crisis and its aftermath were
demonstrably due to leading international banks placing their profitability and
capacity to deliver shareholder value far above their capacity for risk management
and commitment to customer service (Biondi&Graeff, 2020;Henwood, 1998; Smith,
Clarke,&Rogers, 2017). As the fall-out from thefinancial crisis continued, successive
banks that collapsed, including most spectacularly Lehman Brothers and the Royal
Bank of Scotland, were revealed to have engaged in reckless practices to sustain
their shareholders returns (Clarke, 2011; Clarke & Chanlat, 2009; FSA, 2011).
British and European based corporations were not immune to these pressures,
in terms of focusing on profitability and shareholder returns to the neglect of risk
management. For example, on 20 April 2010, BP was responsible for the worst
man-made environmental disaster with the explosion of the Deepwater rig in the
Gulf of Mexico due to neglect due to its systemic neglect of basic safety procedures
caused byBP’s relentless pursuit of profitability (Clarke, 2017a). Later Volkswagen,
the leading car manufacturer in the world at the time, committed mass fraud
against both the regulators and its own customers in the failure to comply with car
emissions controls in a desperate bid to increase its market share of diesel autos
(Clarke, 2017b). At both BP and VW the inclination to increase sales and profits
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overwhelmed the sense of responsibility that these companies had often professed
(Clarke, 2017b). However, the recent failures at Boeing have highlighted evenmore
acutely the dangers of putting financial interests before safety.
2.4 Boeing
Boeing was for decades one of the most respected corporations in America. As the
major manufacturer of commercial airliners Boeing was assumed to adhere to the
highest standards of precision engineering with the paramount goal of ensuring
the safety of the hundreds of millions of passengers who flew in Boeing aircraft.
But soon after the launch of the new Boeing plane, two 737MAX passenger airlines
crashed within five months exposing the most egregious failures in Boeing’s
operating procedures (Hawkens, 2019; Steib, 2019). On 29 October 2018, a Lion Air
flight from Jakarta crashed within 12 min of take-off killing all 180 passengers and
crew. Then on 10 March 2019 an Ethiopian Airlines flight from Addis Ababa
crashedwithin 6min of take-off killing all 157 passengers and crew. Yet Boeing had
known of problems with the flight control system for about a year before the
accidents (Wall Street Journal 5 May 2019). A month after the first accident, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), responsible for regulating all aspects of
civil aviation in the United States, had conducted an internal safety risk analysis
that indicated a high risk of an unacceptable accident rate if the 737 MAX’s new
Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) was not fixed, which
automatically and repeatedly forced the aircraft to nosedive concluding:
“…A single erroneously high angle of attack (AOA) sensor input to the flight control system
while the flaps are retracted can cause repeated airplane nose-down trim of the horizontal
stabilizer and multiple flight-deck effects. These effects include stall warning activation,
airspeed disagree alert, and altitude disagree alert, and may affect the flight crew’s ability to
accomplish continued safe flight and landing” (FAA, 2019: 5).
Instructions on the new features of MCAS was omitted from flight manuals and
crew training, and left pilots exposed to manoeuvres they could not control. The
FAA reaffirmed the 737 MAX’s airworthiness on 11 March 2019 but grounded the
aircraft on 13 March after receiving new evidence of accident similarities; by 18
March 2019, the aircraft was grounded world-wide indefinitely (FAA, 2019).
The ensuing US Congress and regulatory investigations by the Federal Avia-
tion Administration discovered that Boeing did not adequately analyse the safety
of design changes to MCAS or adequately inform the FAA, and in November 2019
the FAA revoked Boeing’s authority to issue airworthiness certification for the 737
MAX. Boeing accepted the need for further flight simulation training for pilots.
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Meanwhile, messages sent two years earlier from pilot employees about the safety
of the airplane were revealed (New York Times 18 October 2019). Boeing’s deter-
mined focus on getting the airplane into the market had defeated its instincts and
policies for safety. As a result, instead of making vast sales, Boeing faced the
longest ever grounding of a US passenger airplane ever as a result of regulatory
scrutiny, together with $10 billion in revenue losses and compensation expenses,
representing 13% of its annual revenues in 2019 (Baker, 2019; FAA, 2020; US
Department of Transportation, 2020).
The US Congress Transport and Infrastructure Final Committee Report on the
design, development and certification of the Boeing 737 MAX recognised that both
Boeing and the FAA fundamentally failed in their duties to protect the safety of the
travelling public. “There was tremendous financial pressure on Boeing and the 737
MAX program to compete with Airbus’ new A320neo aircraft. Among other things,
this pressure resulted inextensive efforts to cut costs,maintain the 737MAXprogram
schedule, and avoid slowing the 737 MAX production line. The Committee’s inves-
tigation has identified several instances where the desire to meet these goals and
expectations jeopardized the safety of the flying public” (2020:11–12).
Damningly the Transport and Infrastructure Final Committee Report stated that:
“Boeing’s economic incentives led the company to a significant lack of transparency with the
FAA, its customers, and 737 MAX pilots regarding pilot training requirements and negatively
compromised safety” (2020: 23).
By avoiding the need for simulator training of pilots for the 737 MAX in the airlines
purchasing the new planes Boeing saved many hundreds of millions of dollars
(2020: 26). The Committee Report concluded:
“This report’smain investigative findings point to a company culture that is in serious need of
a safety reset. Boeing has gone from being a great engineering company to being a big
business focused on financial success. Continuing on the same path it followed with the 737
MAX, where safety was sacrificed to production pressures, exposes the company to poten-
tially repeating thosemistakes and to additional reputational damage and financial losses….
Only a genuine, holistic, and assertive commitment to changing the cultural issues unearthed
in the Committee’s investigation at both Boeing and the FAA can enhance aviation safety and
truly help both Boeing and the FAA learn from the dire lessons of the 737 MAX tragedies”
(Transportation and Infrastructure (2020: 238).
The Boeing company now faces a series of lawsuits and legal class actions, and in
December 2019 dismissed its CEO (Baker, 2019). The airline orders of the Boeing
company have collapsed, with more orders being cancelled than placed, for
Boeing the first recorded negative number of sales in 30 years (Slotnick, 2019,
2020). The Boeing company recorded a net loss of $636 million for 2019 (the first
loss in 22 years), compared to a $10 billion profit made in 2018. Boeing’s core
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commercial aircraft operations lost $6.7 billion in 2019, almost entirely due to the
ongoing problems associated with the 737 MAX. The company estimated a total of
$19 billion costs associated with the 737 MAX disaster, but the costs could increase
significantly. These costs do not include the costs of litigation with the victims’
families, though they do include $100 million set aside for a compensation fund
(Isadore, 2020). After being grounded for a year and a half, following changes to
the MCAS software, cockpit procedures and pilot training, the FAA gave permis-
sion in November 2020 for the 737 MAX to fly again (BBC, 2020).
This fall of a great engineering company is a tragic illustration of how the focus
on quick sales and profits and delivering shareholder value can undermine the
essential values and practices in business necessary to ensure health and safety,
and result in a catastrophic collapse in revenues and brand value which are
extraordinarily difficult to restore (MacGillis, 2019). Given the countless illustra-
tions of company failure due to financial recklessness in recent decades, elimi-
nating this dangerous doctrine of shareholder value as the guiding principle of
Anglo-American corporations is a vital task. Many have contributed to this effort,
but few with the resolute impact of Lynn Stout, the late Distinguished Professor of
Cornell Law School. Her work always conveyed lucidity and conviction, but The
Shareholder ValueMyth (2012a; 2012c) was particularly effective in dismantling the
mythology of shareholder value and exposing its dire consequences, and received
international attention from the public, media, regulators and business execu-
tives. At the Clinton Global Initiative annual conference in New York in 2014 she
was proud to be the speaker following President Obama.
3 Why Lynn Stout was Right
The cardinal principle of agency theory is shareholder primacy. This central myth
of agency theory which Lynn Stout addresses is that corporations are – and should
be – in thrall to their shareholders. The view that shareholders’ interests are the
sole determinant of corporate direction has little credibility in law, or in reality,
(and as the above cases illustrate the emphasis on a singular imperative of max-
imising shareholder value can prove positively dangerous). Corporate law inmany
jurisdictions states simply that directors and officers must exercise their powers
and discharge their duties “in good faith and in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.” The meaning of this injunction continues to evolve and be contested. As the
corporation is an artificial legal arrangement, the ongoing debate is whether it
should be meant to serve narrowly the owners of the shares of the corporation, or
more widely to encompass the interests of all stakeholders who have contributed
in some way to the success of the company (Blair & Stout, 1999; Clarke, 2013,
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2014a). There have been no court cases that clarify this issue definitively in many
jurisdictions and therefore the phrase is still open to subjective interpretation,
though in the United States several states recognize the legitimacy of directors
taking stakeholder interests into account. The view inmany jurisdictions is that the
lawpermitsflexibility and the exercise of directors’ judgement, and this is seen as a
good thing (Blair & Stout, 2001a; Blair, 1995; Stout, 2012d).
As Lazonick (2014) maintains, in the decades following the New Deal and
Second World War, a more balanced view of the responsibilities of corporations
prevailed in an era where Galbraith (1967) and Chandler (1977) celebrated tech-
nocratic managerialism:
“From the end ofWorldWar II until the late 1970s, a retain-and-reinvest approach to resource
allocation prevailed at major U.S. corporations. They retained earnings and reinvested them
in increasing their capabilities, first and foremost in the employees who helped make firms
more competitive. They provided workers with higher incomes and greater job security, thus
contributing to equitable, stable economic growth- what I call ’sustainable prosperity.’ This
pattern began to break down in the late 1970s, givingway to a downsize-and-distribute regime
of reducing costs and then distributing the freed-up cash to financial interests, particularly
shareholders. By favouring value extraction over value creation, this approach has contrib-
uted to employment instability and income inequality” (Lazonick, 2014, 2017).
In analysing how shareholder primacy displaced sustainable prosperity as the
business goal in the thinking of US business leaders, three fundamental mistakes
in the legal understanding of the company of agency theory are highlighted by
Lynn Stout (Stout, 2012a: 4):
Friedman’s erroneous belief that shareholders “own” corporations, when in fact as legal
entities corporations own themselves. Shareholders own shares, a security contract
arrangement between the shareholder and the company that gives shareholders limited legal
rights. Shareholders therefore stand on equal footing with bondholders, employees and
suppliers, all of whom enter into contracts with the firmwhich give them limited legal rights.
The argument that shareholders are the residual claimants of the company (claiming all
corporate profits after the fixed contractual claims of creditors, employees and suppliers have
been paid) is also wrong. In fact, shareholders are residual claimants only when failed
companies are liquidated in bankruptcy. The law is different for healthy companies as going
concerns which are their own residual claimant. The company is entitled to keep its profits
and to use them as the board sees fit. The boardmay decide to distribute some of these profits
to shareholders, but can choose to raise employees’ salaries, or invest in research and
development, or make contributions to charities (Anthony, 1960).
The claim that directors and executives are shareholders “agents.” The legal understanding
of any principal/agent relationships is that the principal has the right to control the agent’s
behaviour. In fact, shareholders lack this legal authority to control directors or executives.
Shareholders governance rights in public companies are limited, and indirect, consisting
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primarily of the right to vote onwho should sit on the board, and the right to bring legal action
for breach of fiduciary duty. In practice these rights are limited, since as long as directors do
not exercise their powers to enrich themselves, the “business judgement rule” protects di-
rectors from liability in most circumstances. (Stout, 2012a: 4)
The common legal view is that it is the role of the directors to determine what is in
the best interests of the company unless no reasonable director could have reached
the decision. The contribution of Lynn Stout’s book is to clearly analyse and
explain how such common-sense views of the world were replaced by the narrow
and constricting dictum of shareholder value. As Blair and Stout (2001) insist
shareholder primacy does not stack up either in law or in practice:
“The idea that shareholders alone are the raison d’etre of the corporation has come to
dominate contemporary discussion of corporate governance, both outside and (in many
cases) inside the boardroom. Yet the ‘shareholder primacy’ claim seems at oddswith a variety
of important characteristics of US corporate law. Despite the emphasis legal theorists have
given shareholder primacy in recent years, corporate law itself does not obligate directors to
do what the shareholders tell them to do. Nor does it compel the board to maximize share
value. To the contrary, directors of public corporations enjoy a remarkable degree of freedom
from shareholder command and control. Similarly, the law grants them wide discretion to
consider the interests of other corporate participants in their decision-making – even when
this adversely affects the value of the stockholders’ shares.” (Blair & Stout, 2001: 5).
Lynn Stout’sThe Shareholder ValueMyth (2012a) demonstrates howanunfortunate
lacuna in corporate law was filled by the simplistic tenets of agency theory, which
has promulgated enduring myths of shareholder primacy that have been mis-
construed as authentic legal interpretations of directors’ duties, and often guided
directors with increasingly narrow and damaging corporate objectives. The tenets
of shareholder value are portrayed as eternal, universal and unarguable. Lynn
Stout resoundingly and convincingly exposes the multiple fallacies of each of
these claims concerning shareholder value: the ascendancy of the claim of
shareholder primacy (though it may have been stated in the past) is of compara-
tively recent origin in the agency theory wave in neo-classical economics of the
1970s (Henwood, 1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) The claim to universality of
agency theory is bogus, since it is verymuch anAnglo-American construct, that for
a long time was regarded as an alien intrusion into forms of European and Asian
corporate governance (while it has nowmore influence in these regions due to the
scale and power of Anglo-American investment institutions, shareholder primacy
is still questioned on serious grounds ofmorality andpracticality inmost regions of
the world (Clarke, 2016; Clarke & Boersma, 2017). Similarly the critique of the basic
principles of shareholder value has remained widespread and robust in the Anglo
American world (Clarke, 2014a; Lazonick, 2012; Weinstein, 2013).
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The mythology of shareholder value has proved one of the most debilitating
ideologies of modern times. The pursuit of shareholder value has damaged and
shrunk corporations, distracted andweakenedmanagers, diverted and undermined
economies, and, most paradoxically, neglected the long-term interests of share-
holders. It was in this period that the Anglo-American corporation was crudely
translated from a wealth and welfare creating vehicle for the wider community of
stakeholders and whole economy, with an emphasis on the importance of all
corporate resources including the capabilities and training of employees, into a
bundle portfolio of assets with the sole purpose of benefiting shareholder interests.
Experienced corporate managers with a deep knowledge and capability in the
business,were replacedduring this periodwithmanagers fromoutside the company
drawn from finance, disconnected from the business units but focusing on financial
markets and results. Holding companies came to control many formerly indepen-
dent companies (Weinstein, 2012). Lynn Stout discusses these “toxic” consequences
of the maximisation of shareholder value alienating employees, customers, sup-
pliers and communities (Clarke et al., 2019; Stout, 2013b, 2016).
Finally, Lynn Stout insists that the “relentless focus on raising the share price of
individual firms may be not only misguided but harmful to investors” (Stout, 2012a:
7). It is the ultimate irony that maximising shareholder value is so misguided it
damages the interests of all stakeholders and may be ultimately especially harmful
to the interests of long-termshareholding investors. In fact, agency theory reifies and
misrepresents shareholders just as badly as it misunderstands every other stake-
holder in the business enterprise. Lynn Stout offers a more balanced and accurate
assessment of the composition and orientations of the ultimate shareholders:
“If we stop to examine the reality of who ’the shareholder’ really is – not an abstract creature
obsessed with the single goal of raising the share price of a single firm today, but real human
beings with the capacity to think for the future… and to make binding commitments, with a
wide range of investments and interests beyond the shares they happen to hold in any single
firm, andwith consciences thatmakemost of them concerned, at least a bit, about the fates of
others, future generations, and the planet” (Stout, 2012a: 6).
Lynn Stout did not live to see the unravelling of the doctrine of shareholder
primacy and the potential abandonment of the maximisation of shareholder
value as the central driver of US corporations, but this now does appear, to a
degree at least, to be occurring in slow motion (Clarke, 2015;1998). The
growing emergence of the Social License to Operate, the open debate on the
Purpose of the Corporation (a company’s fundamental reason for being), the
revision of the core principle of the US Business Roundtable around corporate
responsibility, and interest around the world in redefining the social and
environmental obligations of corporations in the context of the devastating
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potential impact of climate change is beginning to suggest the absolute reign
of shareholder primacy is coming to an end (Clarke, 2007; 2016; Veldman &
Jansson, 2020).
The widespread scepticism concerning aspects of what purports to be corpo-
rate social responsibility in the past, can lead to rejection of the viability of the
concept (Fleming & Jones, 2013), and revelations of the extent of greenwashing
undermining the corporate commitments to sustainability (Gatti, Seele, & Rade-
macher, 2019; Netto, Sobral, Ribeira, & Soares, 2020), might suggest approaching
new initiatives in this space with some caution. But what is impressive presently is
the number of number and quality of initiatives around theworld, coalescing in the
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. All this is occurring in the context
of the dawning realisation of the desperate consequences of climate change for the
economy and society if concerted action by governments, corporations and com-
munities is not taken quickly.
3.1 The Emerging Social License to Operate
The gradual emergence of the concept of the Social License to Operate, (SLO)
instead of “business as usual” (BAV), beginning with the extractive industries
and extending now to the finance sector and other critical business sectors, is
one indication of an incipient seismic shift in business responsibility. It is
difficult to be serious about a Social License to Operate while conforming to the
wickedest tenets of maximising shareholder value (despite what Friedman said
about “The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits” and
his insistence on corporations staying within the law). As the Social License
gains traction, the demonstration of corporate social and environmental re-
sponsibility becomes more exacting (though remains still to be closely defined
and measured):
“The social license to operate (SLO), or simply social license, refers to the ongoing acceptance
of a company or industry’s standard business practices and operating procedures by its
employees, stakeholders, and the general public.
Social license to operate is created and maintained slowly over time as the actions of a
company build trust with the community it operates in and other stakeholders.
In order to protect and build social license, companies are encouraged to do the right thing,
and then be seen doing the right thing” (Kenton, 2019).
Maintaining theSocial License to0perate is becomingembedded inbusinesspurpose,
as it is coming to be recognised as a strategic risk in which corporate legitimacy,
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credibility and trust are in thebalance. Corporations, aswith other institutions, cannot
function effectively for long without legitimacy, credibility and trust. The Social Li-
cense to 0perate resonates with the traditional relationship-based approach to busi-
ness in Europe, and the modern interpretation of the Social License to 0perate is
accepted widely by corporations throughout Europe and the UK. Now with the US
Business Roundtable’s new declaration of corporate purpose the social licensewill be
considered by more large corporations in the United States (Autenne et al., 2018;
British Academy, 2018; Business Roundtable, 2019; Clarke, 2019). The social license is
central to a new OECD initiative on Trust in Business, and appears to resonate with
business internationally, and to relate closely to the United Nations Sustainable
Development Goals (OECD, 2019; UNEP, 2020).
A significant indication of this change in business mood was BlackRock CEO
Larry Fink’s (2019) Letter to CEOs of the thousands of companies around the world
in which BlackRock is a lead investor, in which he sets out the principles of the
Purpose of the Corporation:
“…Every company needs a framework to navigate this difficult landscape, and it must begin
with a clear embodiment of your company’s purpose in your business model and corporate
strategy.
Purpose is not a mere tagline or marketing campaign; it is a company’s fundamental reason
for being – what it does every day to create value for its stakeholders … (Fink, 2019)”
A primary criticism of stakeholder capitalism is that any purpose other than
shareholder profits results in a lack of focus and, can lead to corruption. This
critique logically follows from the view that CEOs can be self-serving arbiters of
social value and would, if given the opportunity, divert resources to their own
enrichment under the guise of “purpose.” In his 2019 letter to CEOs, Larry Fink
disagrees with this assumption, stating in bold lettering: “Purpose is not the sole
pursuit of profits but the animating force for achieving them. Profits are in no way
inconsistent with purpose – in fact, profits and purpose are inextricably linked”
(Fink, 2019). Since BlackRock, with over $8.44 trillion in assets undermanagement
in October August 2020 was the largest investor in the world, there was every
reason for the CEOs of the thousands of companies that BlackRock is invested in, to
sit up and listen. The question is whether this is largely a significant change in
rhetoric being called for, or whether more substantive changes in business ob-
jectives and practices are being demanded? An important test case of this question
is the apparent sudden about- turn of the US Business Roundtable from a con-
servative shareholder value commitment held for some years, to a more inclusive
stakeholder capitalism perspective in 2019.
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3.2 US Business Roundtable: The Purpose of the Corporation
The US Business Roundtable represents among the largest corporations in the
United States and has tended to reflect and propagate the dominant business
sentiments of the time. In 1981 adopting an expansive view of corporate purpose
the Business Roundtable stated:
“Corporations have a responsibility, first of all, tomake available to the public quality goods and
services at fair prices, thereby earning a profit that attracts investment to continue and enhance
the enterprise, provide jobs, and build the economy … That economic responsibility is by no
means incompatible with other corporate responsibilities in society” (Business Roundtable,
1981: 12).
However, by 1997 the Business Roundtable had swung around into the Friedman
shareholder primacy view, and sharply narrowed its focus to delivering share-
holder value:
“The principal objective of a business enterprise is to generate economic returns to its owners. . . 1f
the CEO and the directors are not focused on shareholder value, it may be less likely the corpo-
ration will realize that value… 1n the Business Roundtable’s view, the paramount duty of man-
agement and of boards of directors is to the corporation’s stockholders; the interests of other
stakeholders are relevant as a derivative of the duty to stockholders. The notion that the board
must somehow balance the interests of stockholders against the interests of other stakeholders
fundamentally misconstrues the role of directors” Business Roundtable, 1997: 1, 3).
Then in the context of increasingly apparent environmental threats, new corporate
regulation being proposed in theUSCongress pursuedbyElizabethWarren, Bernie
Sanders and others, and alarmed by an increasing public perception that corpo-
rationswere essentially self-interested that President Trumpdid little to dispel, in a
slightly stunning press release from their 2019 meeting in Washington the US
Business Roundtable engaged in a very public volte-face:
“US Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote ‘An Econ-
omy That Serves All Americans’ (19 August 2019)
Press release: WASHINGTON – Business Roundtable today announced the release of a new
Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation signed by 181 CEOs who commit to lead their
companies for the benefit of all stakeholders – customers, employees, suppliers, commu-
nities and shareholders.
Since 1978, Business Roundtable has periodically issued Principles of Corporate Governance.
Each version of the document issued since 1997 has endorsed principles of shareholder
primacy – that corporations exist principally to serve shareholders. With today’s
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announcement, the new Statement supersedes previous statements and outlines a modern
standard for corporate responsibility.”
This announcement of “a modern standard for corporate responsibility,” and the
accompanying analysis received front page coverage in the US national press, and
international media. “The American dream is alive, but fraying,” said Jamie
Dimon, Chairman and CEO of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Chairman of Business
Roundtable. “Major employers are investing in their workers and communities
because they know it is the only way to be successful over the long term. These
modernized principles reflect the business community’s unwavering commitment
to continue to push for an economy that serves all Americans.” (David Gelles and
David Yaffe-Bellany, Shareholder Value Is No Longer Everything, Top C.E.O.s Say,
New York Times 19 August 2019).
“This new statement better reflects the way corporations can and should
operate today,” added Alex Gorsky, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer of Johnson & Johnson and Chair of the Business Roundtable Corporate
Governance Committee. “It affirms the essential role corporations can play in
improving our society when CEOs are truly committed to meeting the needs of all
stakeholders” (New York Times 19 August 2019).
The shift from a shareholder primacy to a stakeholder rhetoric was adroitly
handled in the press as a legitimate and rightful progression (when it was arguably a
rhetorical return to the business values of the Roosevelt-Kennedy era) which might
have caused some consternation among some sections of activist shareholder ranks if
they thought it was serious. However the fact that the new statement of stakeholder
principles was agreed by 181 CEO members of the Business Roundtable, including
leading captains of US industry such as Tim Cook of Apple, Jeff Bezos of Amazon,
Larry Fink of BlackRock, Brian Moynihan of Bank of America, and Mary Barra of
GeneralMotors provided conviction to theRoundtable statement that few in themedia
were prepared to contest. There were 181 CEO signatures attached to the new State-
ment on the Purpose of a Corporation (Business Roundtable, 2019) which stated:
“Americans deserve an economy that allows each person to succeed through hard work and
creativity and to lead a life of meaning and dignity. We believe the free-market system is the
bestmeans of generating good jobs, a strong and sustainable economy, innovation, a healthy
environment and economic opportunity for all.
Businesses play a vital role in the economy by creating jobs, fostering innovation and
providing essential goods and services. Businesses make and sell consumer products;
manufacture equipment and vehicles; support the national defense; grow and produce food;
provide health care; generate and deliver energy; and offer financial, communications and
other services that underpin economic growth. While each of our individual companies
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serves its own corporate purpose, we share a fundamental commitment to all of our stake-
holders. We commit to:
Delivering value to our customers. We will further the tradition of American companies
leading the way in meeting or exceeding customer expectations.
Investing in our employees. This starts with compensating them fairly and providing
important benefits. It also includes supporting them through training and education that help
develop new skills for a rapidly changing world. We foster diversity and inclusion, dignity
and respect.
Dealing fairly and ethically with our suppliers. We are dedicated to serving as good partners
to the other companies, large and small, that help us meet our missions.
Supporting the communities in which we work. We respect the people in our communities
and protect the environment by embracing sustainable practices across our businesses.
Generating long-term value for shareholders, who provide the capital that allows companies
to invest, grow and innovate. We are committed to transparency and effective engagement
with shareholders.
Each of our stakeholders is essential. We commit to deliver value to all of them, for the future
success of our companies, our communities and our country” (Business Roundtable, 2019).
Except for the expressed belief in the free market system, it is likely that Milton
Friedman would be far from happy at this remarkable statement of stakeholder
capitalism principles by the leaders of US business. Lynn Stout would probably
be slightly amazed at the thoroughness of the stakeholder framework commit-
ments that would not have been acceptable just a few years earlier to many CEOs
who seemed now happy to sign up for them. From 1997 through to 2018 the
Business Roundtable maintained a practice of issuing Principles of Corporate
Governance which advocated the principle of shareholder primacy and relegated
the interests of any other stakeholders as strictly “derivative of the duty to
stockholders” (Posner, 2019). In her very direct way Lynn Stout might well have
asked “While this 2019 Business Roundtable Statement is certainly a remarkable
change in business rhetoric, will it be accompanied by any substantive action of
significance?”
The Roundtable Statement was signed by 181 CEOs of Business Roundtable
companies, but there were 241 CEOs in membership of the Roundtable in 2019,
meaning 60 CEOs chose not to sign a document that would normally receive
universal consent (and no reference was made to their views in the Statement.
Questions remain to be answered regarding why the Business Roundtable should
make such a comprehensive change in policy at this time, and about how viable in
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terms of translation into transformed operational values and practices is the US
Business Roundtable’s new vision of business purpose?
Besides the sharp jolt of Larry Fink’s letter to all of them, the CEOs would be
aware of a growing public sense of concern, and often anger, at the apparent
indifference of big business to the complex social and economic problems insis-
tently impacting upon, and disfiguring, the United States (Clarke et al., 2019).
Widespread under-employment, sustained low wages, extensive entrenched
poverty, growing inequality, social and community break-down and environ-
mental disaster within the United States, and often evenmore extreme in the other
countries and regions they operated in, was no longer something large US cor-
porations could readily ignore. As Martin Wolf put it:
“The public at large increasingly views corporations as sociopathic and so as indifferent to
everything, other than the share price, and corporate leaders as indifferent to everything,
other than personal rewards. Judged by real wages and productivity, their recent economic
performance has been mediocre. Furthermore, corporations have been allowed to corrode
competition… In short, bad ideas have seized the corporation and let competition waste
away” (Financial Times 12 December 2018).
Recognising that they, the CEOs, had to appear as part of the solution rather than a
significant cause of the problem required an urgent recalibration of their public
image if not their policies, which Jamie Dimon the Chairman of the Business
Roundtable was perceptive enough to see. The reality was that US business had
fallen behind business from other world regions in their sense of commitment to
corporate social and environmental responsibility, as indicated in a survey of
CSRhub recently (Figure 6). Both the American public and many of the CEOs
themselves realised something needed to be done according to recent surveys
conducted for Fortune magazine (Figure 7).
Doubts concerning the social and environmental responsibility of US business
will continue until there is solid evidence of action for change. There is some
indication that some of the CEO’s involved are becoming aware of these concerns.
Representative views of the CEOs (US Business Roundtable, 2019) included:
– Ginni Rometty, CEO of IBM: “Society gives each of us a license to operate. Lt’s a
question of whether society trusts you or not.”
– Alex Gorsky, CEO, Johnson and Johnson: “People are asking fundamental
questions about how well capitalism is serving society.”
– Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan Chase and Chair of the Business Roundtable:
“This is an acknowledgement that business can do more to help the average
American.”
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Views onwhether the dramatic turnaround in the definition of business purpose by
the Business Roundtable might have any practical utility were divided. The busi-
ness academic community was generally supportive, but a little more exacting in
their expectations (MIT, 2019):
– Anita McGahan, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto: “The
focus on stakeholders is a focus on value creation. Managing for shareholder
supremacy amounted to running businesses for their residual claimants rather
than for sustained superior performance.”
– Meghan Busse, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University: “A
true broadening of the ob}ectives of firms would improve the well-being of
Figure 7: The Changing Views of American and Fortune 500 CEOs on Business Purpose.
Source: Adapted from Fortune, America’s CEOs Seek a New Purpose for the Corporation, 19
August 2019.
Figure 6: Comparative International CSR Performance Index.
Source: Adapted from: https:ffwww.esrhub.eomf.
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workers. But it remains to be seen how many of the CEOs who signed the
statement are truly committed to making such changes, and also how many of
them will and they are able to – given pressures from inside the firm, pressures
from financial markets, and their own career ambitions.”
– Rebecca Henderson, Harvard Business School, Harvard University “The state-
ment is an important first step, but unless it is followed by concrete commitments on
the part of the firms, it will have very little lasting effect on anything.”
3.3 Concrete Commitments or Purpose Washing?
Alan Jope, the CEO of Unilever in a prescient earlier statement emphasised not
backing up purpose messaging could “further destroy trust in our industry”
(Cannes, 18 June 2019). If all that results from the apparent volte-face of the
Business Roundtable is a more accommodating rhetoric around stakeholder in-
terests while still pursuing essentially the same financial metrics around max-
imising shareholder value (while neglecting all other stakeholders), the grand new
Roundtable statement will be proven to be simply another exercise in purpose
washing – cleaning up or disguising the essentially indefensible, whilemaintaining a
consistent path of irresponsible business. Some critics have already dismissed the
vague promises of the Business Roundtable as simply a clever new marketing
exercise:
“The global reader may stumble over some of the phrasing, such as the commitment to a ‘free
market economy that serves all Americans’ – this from multinational companies with globe-
spanningmarkets, outsourcedoperations andcross-border impact.Wemayalsowonderhow the
announcement changes the workings of the free market in any discernible way. The weak
pledges – to look after customers, to maintain good supplier relationships, to care for commu-
nities and the environment – could have been lifted from any one of the companies’ existing
annual reports. Employees at least get some specific assurances – fair compensation, benefits,
training and education, diversity and inclusion – although of course the detail will be in the
interpretation by individual companies. But communities and the environment, the most
vulnerable of stakeholders, get the shortest, vaguest shrift in the statement. Communities will be
“supported” and “respected” and the environment will be “protected” through sustainable
practices. Clicking through on the Business Roundtable’s website it is clear that the community
and environmental investment that these companies have in mind is very much along the
lines of the corporate-social-responsibility-as-charitable-giving that has proven extremely
tax-efficient and brand enhancing in past years, without jeopardising any core profit cen-
tres. There is no commitment to engage with the harder, messier, more painful work of
changing business models to replenish currently abused and depleted communities and
ecosystems” (Meagher, 2019).
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Other sceptics of the new resolve of the Business Roundtable suggest this will not
prevent more fundamental questioning:
“Whether or not the CEOs follow through on their pre-emptive nod to social responsibility,
capitalism is clearly headed for a reckoning … Real-world experience has undermined free
marketeers’near- theological belief that theunfetteredpursuit of self-interest invariablyproduces
the best outcomes for society itself. Banks’ reckless pursuit of profits triggered the landslide of the
2008 financial crisis. Big Pharma made billions by creating an opioid epidemic that has ruined
millions of lives. Fossil-fuel consumption is altering the planet’s climate. The tech industry has
seduced us all into surrendering terabytes of information that it sells at enormous profit. Exec-
utives cut themselves an ever-growing slice of the economic pie, while middle-class workers get
crumbs. As they say on Wall Street, a correction may be coming” (Falk, 2019).
The Covid-19 global pandemic has provided a critical test bed for the renewal of
corporate purpose. As recorded by the Test of Corporate Purpose (TCP, 2020)
initiative the pandemic resulted in a profound economic crisis that exposed the
multiple systemic fault lines around:
– Wealth disparities.
– Ecosystem disruption that promotes novel virus incubation.
– Inadequate health care access and employment safety nets (TCP, 2020: 6).
Though internationally corporations realized they had a role to play in this crisis,
in the midst of the crisis there was evidence of some companies “appearing to put
profits ahead of people and shareholder expectations ahead of employees, com-
munities and ecological well-being” (TCP 2020: 6). From the survey conducted by
TCP (2020: 7) the following sobering conclusions emerged:
– BRT signatories did not outperform their S & P 500 or European counterparts
on the test of corporate purpose since the inception of the pandemic.
– Companies with long track records of performance on corporate responsibility
outperformed others.
– Proactive and substantive responses to the crises of the pandemic and
inequality had the most impact.
– US and European corporations performed similarly.
– Shareholder capitalism is not fit for purpose in such crises, and new forms of
alignment with stakeholders were required.
The Test of Corporate Purpose intends to continue research on whether corpora-
tions are delivering value to all stakeholders; on how employers have ameliorated
or exacerbated inequality in terms of employee welfare and inequality; on the
responsibility of capital allocation; how governance integrates with other envi-
ronmental and social commitments; on lobbying and political spending; and on
taxes and tax havens (TCP, 2020: 8–14).
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Meanwhile a preliminary analysis of empirical data regarding the declarations
and performance of the Business Roundtable companies by Raghunandan and
Rajgopal (2020) offers results that suggest there is a lot to be done. The 118 BRT
signatories claimed that corporation purpose is to deliver value to all stakeholders
rather than to maximise value for shareholders. Yet in a comparison of perfor-
mance with industry peer firms:
– BRT corporations commit environmental and labour related compliance vio-
lations more often and pay more fines;
– Spend more on lobbying policy makers and receive more in targeted gov-
ernment subsidies.
– BRT CEOs receive higher abnormal compensation, and BRT firms have a
smaller proportion of independent directors on the board (Raghunandan &
Rajgopal, 2019).
BRT corporations might claim they need more time to develop their commitments,
but this is not a good place to start from. Exacting public scrutiny of how corporate
performance matches policy declarations needs to continue.
If truly business is to demonstrate greater social and environmental re-
sponsibility this must be reinforced by a positive and productive approach to prac-
tically resolving long-standing fundamental issues of corporate behaviour including:
– Commitment to compliance with relevant corporate regulation.
– Acceptance of changes in directors’ duties.
– Agreement to pay a fair amount of corporate taxes rather than avoiding them.
– Proportionate returns to shareholders relative to their equity commitment
(Biondi, 2012).
– Serious constraints and limits on excessive executive compensation.
– Eradication of wholesale exploitation in global supply chains.
– Acceptance of workers’ rights.
– Commitment to decent work and wages around the world, including in long
supply chains.
– Real commitment to product health and safety.
– Environmental commitments to environmental protection including net zero
emissions.
– Pursuit of the circular economy.
A range of research and policy projects are investigating how corporations could
be held to account for these more exacting standards regarding their purpose and
performance, including the British Academy Future of the Corporation inquiry.
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3.4 British Academy: The Future of the Corporation
The work of the British Academy Future of the Corporation project (2018–2020)
engages in a fundamental re-conceptualizing of business purpose. The British
Academy began its inquirywith a steely view of the impact of Friedman’s legacy on
business:
“In 1962, Milton Friedman set out a framework for business in which he described the social
responsibility of businesses as being to increase profits so long as they staywithin the rules of
the game. It was a powerful and influential proposition that established the conventional
framework for business around the world. However, it has serious deficiencies and is no
longer tenable as a framework for business in the 21st century. It has been the source of
growing disaffection with business, its environmental, social and political problems, and the
erosionof trust in it. Those problemswill intensify in the future as technological advances risk
exacerbating social detriments as well as. benefits of corporations, and public policy re-
sponses lag increasingly far behind innovations.” (British Academy, 2018: 10).
The Future of the Corporation project sought to examine the contemporary purpose
of corporations and redefine law and regulation to enable a newmodel of business
withwider purposes and accomplishments (Hsieh,Meyer, Rodin, & Klooster, 2018;
Mayer, 2013). TheBritishAcademy inquiry commenced its research on the Future of
the Corporation around main themes: history, purpose, trust, culture, technology,
law, regulation and taxation, corporate governance, ownership, investment and
social benefits. The new framework of the corporation the inquiry began to
formulate involved a reinterpretation and integration of three principles: (i) a
redefining of corporate purpose that is distinct from shareholder returns, (ii) an
establishment of trustworthiness founded on norms of integrity, and (iii) the
embedding of a culture in organisations that enables both (British Academy, 2018:
10). Propelling the British Academy inquiry was an urgent sense of the impact of
climate change, the urgency of delivering the UN Sustainable Development Goals,
recent advances in technology, the increasing dominance of companies without
significant tangible assets, and the widespread negative perceptions of business
(British Academy, 2019: 5).
The early conclusions of the British Academy inquiry were that the purpose of
business is to solve problems of people and planet profitably, and not profit from
causing problems. The elements of purposeful business included a series of
principles (British Academy, 2019: 8):
– “Corporate law should place purpose at the heart of the corporation and require
directors to state their purposes and demonstrate commitment to them.
– Regulation should expect particularly high duties of engagement, loyalty and
care on the part of directors of companies to public interests where they
perform important public functions.
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– Ownership should recognise obligations of shareholders and engage them in
supporting corporate purposes as well as in their rights to derive financial
benefit.
– Corporate governance should align managerial interests with companies’
purposes and establish accountability to a range of stakeholders through
appropriate board structures. They should determine a set of values necessary
to deliver purpose, embedded in their company culture.
– Measurement should recognise impacts and investment by companies in their
workers, societies and natural assets both within and outside the firm.
– Performance should be measured against fulfilment of corporate purposes
and profits measured net of the costs of achieving them.
– Corporatefinancing should be of a formandduration that allows companies to
fund more engaged and long-term investment in their purposes.
– Corporate investment should be made in partnership with private, public and
not- for-profit organisations that contribute towards the fulfilment of corpo-
rate purposes.”
A purposeful business would calibrate each of these elements into the delivery of
value creation and innovation for all stakeholders (Figure 8).
Figure 8: The Elements of a Purposeful Business.
Source: Adapted from: Principles for Purposeful Business, Future of the Corporation, The British
Academy (2019).
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This summary of the elements of purposeful business is comprehensive and
compelling, but again fundamental questions arise as to the operational means of
implementing these principles. Of course, this is for national regulators, investment
markets and individual corporations to work through. But until there are more in-
dications of demonstrable changes occurring, and the detail of how thesework, then
the elements of purposeful business remain as ideals rather than reality. Translating
the ideals into reality will require a momentous transformation of corporate law,
governance, strategy, operations, performance measures and disclosures.
4 The Developing Momentum for Responsible
Business
Yet the British Academy initiative is part of a developing momentum of research
and policy bodies internationally to achieve a blueprint for more responsible
business practice. A pioneer of this effort was the UK Royal Society of Arts’ To-
morrow’s Company inquiry (1992–5), investigating the sources of sustainable
business success with a network of 25 international corporations (Clarke &
Monkhouse, 1994, 1995). Influential in the United States was Margaret Blair’s
Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the 21st Century (1995;
Clarke, 1998), and Blair and Stout’s Team Production Theory of Corporate Law
(1999; 2001a; 2001b). This research contributed to the thinking of the UK Modern
Company Law Review (1998–2001) (Company Law Review Steering Group, 2001),
that considered shareholder primacy and stakeholder orientations of the corpo-
ration, resulting in Section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006 (UK Government
2006) which outlines the wider responsibilities of company directors towards
employees, customers, the community and environment, though translation of
these responsibilities into practice has yet to occur. On an international scale the
interest in responsible investment in corporations for the long termwas developed
through the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) body of large
global institutional investors (ICGN, 2016).
There are many recent international contributions to the literature on the
transformation of the corporation (Clarke, O’Brien, & O’Kelley, 2019b). In the United
States Bill Lazonick has worked assiduously to secure wider public recognition of
the negative impact of shareholder primacy on the investment horizons of corpo-
rations, and the urgent need for reorienting corporations, including research with
the Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET) on the impact of share buy-backs
and dividend payments on long-term investment in business innovation (Lazonick,
2017; Lazonick, Sakinc, & Hopkins, 2020; Lazonick & Shin, 2019). The Critical Cor-
poration Project (2012–18) at the Cass Business School at City University, London,
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has investigated the contemporary corporation from a critical perspective (Baars &
Spicer, 2017), and the Frank Bold international law firm is conducting the Purpose of
the Corporation Project (Frank Bold, 2019). Finally, the European Law Institute has
launched a major research project on corporate sustainability (Autenne et al., 2018;
ELI, 2019).
The academic discourse on the corporation has resonatedwidely in the political
arena in recent times in practical proposals for legislative change. Just as thework of
Berle and Means (1932) informed many of the reforms of Roosevelt’s New Deal in
America in the 1930s and remained influential through to the Kennedy era of the
early 1960s, so today the academic critique of the corporations has impacted on
political deliberations. In theUS Congress there has occurred a sequence of attempts
to transform corporate legislation-including by Elizabeth Warren and John McCain
in the Senate in 2017 to introduce a 21st Century Glass- Steagall Bill (US Senate, 2017)
intended to reintroduce the separation of retail and investment banking to reduce
the possibility of further financial crises, as part of Warren’s crusade to reform
corporate law; and in 2018 the Reward Work Bill by Senator Tammy Baldwin to rein
in the hundreds of billions of dollars of share buy-backs by corporations that benefit
their executives, and to introduce the election of one third of company boards by
their employees (US Senate, 2018). Though these bills were not passed, the intent to
reform business is growing in the US Congress among the Democrat majority in the
House of Representatives at least, and thepolitical pressure to reformcorporations is
likely to continue to grow in the United States and internationally.
At the European Commission proposals to advance sustainable investment
are aimed at ensuring disclosure of investors and asset managers in order to
integrate environmental, social, and governance processes into their risk-
management processes, including benchmarks for low-carbon and positive
carbon impact activity (European Commission, 2018, 2019). Further European
proposals on Sustainable Corporate Governance aim to improve the regulatory
framework to enable corporations to focus on long-term sustainable value cre-
ation rather than short term returns throughout their value chains ((Europa,
2020), as part of the European Green Deal (2019). The French government has a
policy L’entreprise, objet d’interet collectif (Republique Francaise, 2018) pro-
posing the formulation of a raison d’etre by French companies to manage the
company in its own interests while considering its social mission and environ-
mental obligations was passed into law which “introduces the notion of raison
d’etre and affords the possibility for any corporation to assign social or envi-
ronmental purposes to itself, defined in its bylaws” (Segrestin, Hatchuel, &
Leillain, 2020). Finally, the UK parliamentary inquiry into corporate governance
failings highlighted problems with executive pay, directors’ duties, and the
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This prompted a radical report subtitled Democratising Corporations for their
Long-Term Success (Sikka et al., 2018) commissioned by the UK Labour Party,
which returnedwith conviction to the concept of worker directors after a hiatus of
over 40 years since the publication of the UK Bullock Report (Bullock, 1977) that
considered the prospects of industrial democracy.
Most importantly, the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have
galvanised governments and corporations around the world. The Sustainable
Development Goals have called upon business to explicitly focus on minimising
their damaging impact on people and the environment, and to promote initia-
tives where they can contribute to social and environmental well-being. The UN
SDGs prioritised by business according to the World Business Council for Sus-
tainable Development are set out in Figure 9 (WBCSD, 2018). The energy and
commitment that leading corporations demonstrate in the achievement of these
sustainable development goals will be the ultimate test of their commitment to
the exercise of greater responsibility (Clarke, 2019). Corporations may well be
most interested in the Sustainable Development Goals that match their own
immediate concerns, but the SDGs area significant way of inducing corporations
to consider the wider impact they have upon the world, and how the benefits of
this impact could be enhanced, and the damaging impact eliminated.
5 Conclusions: Beyond Rhetoric to Driving
Purpose
The business world has travelled some way in recent years towards demonstrating
amore responsible purpose. The stark beliefs of Milton Friedman have finally been
cast aside after half a century of almost hegemonic rule of business thinking. The
analysis of Lynn Stout and others of a more balanced stakeholder orientation of
business at last seems to be acquiring real traction.Wenowneed to establish a new
agenda for combating predatory value extraction and restoring sustainable eco-
nomic prosperity (Lazonick & Shin, 2019). In the coming years we will discover if
international business is becoming more committed to social and environmental
responsibility in reality, as now is claimed in rhetoric. It is not entirely convincing
that business can save the world (Henderson, 2020a, 2020b), but corporations
might save themselves by reimagining their responsibilities. For this to occur
corporations have to move beyond the rhetoric of being purpose-driven, and
establish clear strategies, targets and measures of corporate social and environ-
mental responsibility, with transparency and disclosure of the detail of their per-
formance made public on a regular basis.
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Presently though, there is a widening gap between the reality of what cor-
porations are actually doing and what is needed to achieve a climate resilient
transformation (IRENA, 2020) with sustainable value creation and innovation.
Not just the future of the corporation, but the future of life on the planet depends
upon this renewed respect for the environment. Similarly, the social inequality
disfiguring the world is no longer tolerable socially and makes no sense
economically. It is time for changes in the law to reinforce the commitments of
corporations to the wider community and environment, which they now claim
they wish to serve.
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